可持续农业与食品研讨会及国际电影节

刚看到这篇文章，意大利人写西藏问题，比较嘲。一半让达老师赖认清形势，见好就收，也就是中文说的“识实务者为俊杰”。如果是中国人写的，标题可以直接改成“劝降书”。还有一半剖析西方心态，大意是说，我们自己的历史也不干不净，不清不楚，占了人家地盘的，现在也不可能还，被占了地盘的，现在也安生过日子了。我们现在有些同志，出于对自己历史的负罪感，跑去淌西藏的混水，精神可嘉，但只会适得其反，还是歇歇吧。末了还不忘自嘲一番，说：尊敬的达老师赖啊，我也不是不想重振拿坡里王朝的雄风，但是没谱的事情，多思无义，反正现在跟着意大利混，也没什么不好，您说呢？

我觉得西藏问题老搞不定，原因之一就是很少有人既懂中国，又懂西藏，大家都在对牛弹琴。我们这边派出去个朱老师维群（btw,这名字太适合搞统战了），搞了那么多年西藏，也没见他说几句藏语。跑去英国，接受BBC采访，字幕打的是“china's minister on tibet”，我都有点替他难为情。

这两天另外一条大新闻就是西班牙ETA的头给抓了，看那些报道和措辞，不由感叹，都是搞分裂，怎么受到的待遇相差那么大呢？嘿嘿。

Tough roads for the Dalai Lama

History is the basis of territory. It has been so in the Earth's long history, as weather and earthquakes shifted the course of rivers, moved mountains, and made and destroyed islands. And it has been in the short human history as wars, conflicts, and political tussles have defined and redefined borders. No wonder, then, that China—historically the country fondest of history—is trying to assert its political position on Tibet via the writing or rewriting of history. After all, for centuries China's cultural stance has been that the new ruling dynasty writes the history of the past dynasty, cutting and pasting events in the manner most convenient for present circumstances. This has been a powerful ideological device, and it is not easy to now discard it.

But history is a convenient ideological instrument only when there is complete control over it—something that is impossible in modern, open societies.

China’s interest in Tibet’s history has prompted different views. Tibet expert Robert Barnett observes that China’s historical claim to Tibet as an integral part of Chinese territory is faulty. “Historically, modern China recognized Tibet as having some sort of special status or position that was not akin to that of a province. Hence the 1910 invasion, the 1951 Agreement, the 1965 Autonomy status, and so on,” he argues acutely. The special status of Tibet is also officially recognized by the Chinese government, which calls the place an “autonomous region” rather than a province. This recognition is complicated by the fact that China now uses the term for other areas that do not historically have a special status. The name "autonomous region" alone raises endless doubts about the history of the ties between Tibet and the rest of China.

However, for China as for the rest of the world, sovereignty over Tibet and the rights and limits of the Dalai Lama if he were to return are not academic but political issues. To base the present Chinese power in the region on faulty history seems to be a harbinger of future problems.

The point seems altogether different. The political reasons for China’s 1951 intervention in Tibet may be open to analysis and political evaluation, and those reasons might be also found to be totally wrong. Was it right for white men to invade the American continent and slaughter its inhabitants? Was it right to practically wipe out native people from Australia or to impose the English language onto Ireland, Scotland, and Wales? Was it right to invade the Kingdom of Naples and the Pontiff State to build the artificial institution of modern Italy? As a matter of fact, is any modern state free of doubt and suspicion surrounding its formation or expansion? Italy lost the cities of Fiume and Pola to Yugoslavia at about the same time that Chinese troops entered Tibet—what would have happened if Italy reclaimed those cities during the breakdown of Yugoslavia in the 1990s?

Tibet has been integral part of the Chinese administration for over half a century de facto like any other province. And Tibet is unlike Hong Kong, which has enjoyed a special status since its “return to the motherland” in 1997. It is thus impossible to realistically think that Beijing could loosen its grip on the region. Chinese leaders would fear that a restive Tibet might consider it encouragement for further thrusts away from Beijing. This view might be conservative or even reactionary, but the popular pro-government movement in China after the March riots in Lhasa proves that the belief enjoys widespread support among the Han majority. Effective autonomy is then out of question, but better management of the region is absolutely necessary—even the most conservative among Chinese officials agree.

We don’t know the reality of the recent discussions between Chinese officials and envoys of the Dalai Lama, but we dare suggest that the Dalai Lama's people consider these realistic political constraints when thinking of a strategy for the bilateral talks. Furthermore, the Dalai Lama envoys can count on dwindling Western support, which was for decades the main source of their leverage over China. In times of economic crisis, China, with a two trillion dollar reserve and no significant deficit, now has powerful leverage over major Western countries beset by bad debts. These countries are therefore much less poised to pressure China on Tibet, objectively a minor and controversial issue.

The Dalai Lama can wait for the economic crisis to peter out, but by then China could be much stronger economically and politically, and the Tibetan cause may not have an improved political position. The potential, short of a major accident, for this future situation should push the Dalai Lama to work with the Chinese authorities on better management of the region and from there move forward.

This resolution may be too little for a group of militants abroad that has never given up and is willing to intensify the struggle. It may even be too little for some Tibetans in Tibet who are giving up Lamaism to return to pre-Buddhist beliefs because they believe that Dalai is a softie with the Chinese. But the political reality is that the Tibetan cause grows weaker by the day, and the Dalai must either wait for a miracle or find a way to deal with the present situation.

Paradoxically, the sooner he accepts a resolution, the less harsh conditions he might be able to extract. In a year, today’s conditions might have disappeared and harsher ones offered. We can say that this is cruel or totally unfair, but that will not change things for the Dalai Lama. Just as Western tears and guilt for the colonial past will not alter that history and will only marginally improve the present for colonial victims. America will not be returned to the natives, nor will Australia. Europe is also unwilling to take back hundreds of millions of emigrants.

Before these huge unsolvable issues, the Western concern for Tibet seems like a Freudian projection of guilt: The sons of the colonizers, unable to redeem their fathers’ faults, try to prevent what they see as a repeat of their fathers’ mistakes. It is a noble and worthy endeavor but must be gauged against real conditions—otherwise, it can be counterproductive.

Furthermore, perhaps it is time to rethink of the horrors of colonization. The first colonies we know of were established around the eight century BC by the Greeks, who battled and defeated Italic populations to establish colonies in what is today southern Italy. The region was later conquered by the Romans. Barbaric hordes followed, and then there were the Byzantine Greeks, the Franks, the Arabs, the Vikings from Normandy, the Germans, the Spanish, the French… Last came troops from Piedmont claiming they were on a mission to re-unite Italy. For over a decade, they fought what was de facto a civil war against local brigands. Yet, when had Italy ever been united? Still, modern populations from southern Italy boast their Greek and Roman ancestry and show off the local baroque architecture of their Spanish rulers, forgetting that these people were all early colonizers and conquerors.

Yes, your Holiness the Dalai Lama, I confess it—I am a southern Italian. Although I might want to, it is impossible to return to the Kingdom of Naples. The best I think I can do is to find a better way to preserve my identity, within the south of a very united Italy.

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